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CRIMINAL LAW-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-CONFLICT OF INTEREST-
LIFE STORY FEE CONTRACT-The California Supreme Court has
held that the possibility of attorney conflicts of interest arising
from a life-story fee contract with an indigent criminal defendant
does not warrant pretrial removal of competent counsel if the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waives the consequences of the
attorney's potential conflicts.
Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d. 248, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1982).
Bobby Joe Maxwell was charged with four counts of robbery and
ten counts of murder.1 Prior to arraignment on the charges, Max-
well entered into a fee contract with his defense counsel, in which
he granted exclusive literary rights to his life story in exchange for
representation up to and including the trial.2
The contract granted Maxwell's counsel the right to print confi-
dential information concerning the defendant's life and waived the
attorney-client privilege upon counsel's request; however, the
agreement did not include attorney's fees for representation in ap-
pellate proceedings.3 The contract further provided that counsel
would receive, as their fee, all rights, including entertainment and
commercial exploitation rights, to the story of Maxwell's life." In
exchange, Maxwell was to receive fifteen percent of the net profits
from the exploitation of his life story as well as counsel's pledge to
raise all appropriate defenses which were in Maxwell's best inter-
est.5 In addition, he received counsel's promise to diligently con-
duct the best defense possible.' The contract also advised Maxwell
1. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 610, 639 P.2d 248, 249, 180 Cal. Rptr.
177, 179 (1982). The defendant faced the possibility of receiving the death penalty due to
the special circumstances surrounding the crimes. Id.
2. Id. at 610, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
3. Id. These fees were subject to further negotiation. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
6. Id. The contract specifically provided:
The Lawyers will raise every defense which they, in their best judgment based upon
their experience feel is warranted by the evidence and information at their disposal
and which, taking into consideration the flow of trial and trial tactics, is in Maxwell's
best interests. The Lawyers will conduct all aspects of the defense of Maxwell as
would a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate.
Id.
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of his right to court-appointed counsel due to his indigency and his
right to seek the advice of independent counsel.7 Maxwell's re-
tained counsel provided him with several listings of local attorneys
to contact for independent advice.8
Maxwell was arraigned in municipal court where he entered a
plea of not guilty, reserving the right to plead not guilty by reason
of insanity.9 Defense counsel informed the court of Maxwell's indi-
gency' ° and further disclosed the existence of the life-story fee con-
tract." Prior to a preliminary hearing, the municipal judge ques-
tioned Maxwell regarding the life-story fee contract, revealing that
Maxwell had been informed of the potential conflicts of interest, 2
but nevertheless desired his retained counsel to defend him subject
to the conditions of the contract.'"
After a preliminary hearing, Maxwell was arraigned in superior
court, where he reiterated his municipal court plea." The superior
court held a special hearing to determine whether the life-story fee
contract created insurmountable conflicts of interest.' Maxwell
again stated that he was aware of the potential conflicts of interest
set forth in the contract and that he knowingly and willingly






12. See Maxwell v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980), rev'd, Maxwell v. Supe-
rior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982). Paragraph 14 of the life-
story fee contract disclosed the following conflicts of interest which might occur between
Maxwell and counsel:
(a) The Lawyers may have an interest to create publicity which would increase the
money which they might get as a result of this agreement, even if this publicity hurt
Maxwell's defense.
(b) The Lawyers may have an interest not to raise certain defenses which would ques-
tion the sanity or mental capacity of Maxwell because to raise these defenses might
make this agreement between the Lawyers and Maxwell void or voidable by Maxwell.
(c) The Lawyers may have an interest in having Maxwell be convicted and even sen-
tenced to death so that there would be increased publicity which might mean that the
Lawyers would get more money as a result of this agreement.
(d) The Lawyers may have other interests which are adverse to Maxwell's interests as
a result of this agreement . ...
161 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
13. 161 Cal. Rptr. at 851.
14. Id. at 852. The court provided an investigator and defense psychiatrist to assist
the defense in the preparation of the case. 30 Cal. 3d at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr.
at 179-80.
15. 30 Cal. 3d at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
16. Id. at 611-12, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Superior court Judge Malone
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spite Maxwell's request to retain his chosen counsel, the trial
court, after reviewing the confidential psychiatric reports submit-
ted, ruled that the life-story fee contract created a conflict of inter-
est between attorney and client, which deprived Maxwell of effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 7 The trial court recused Maxwell's
attorneys and appointed other private counsel to represent him."8
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that the life-story fee contract violated the attorney-
client privilege of confidentiality; that the defendant could not
waive the right to effective assistance of counsel; and that the life-
story fee contract threatened the integrity of the judicial system."9
On appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated the court of
appeals' decison, holding that when a criminal defendant know-
ingly and willingly waives the consequences of potential conflicts of
interest with his retained counsel, pretrial removal of competent
counsel in a criminal case is unwarranted.20
Justice Newman, writing for the majority,2' began by stating
that the controversy, in substance, involved a conflict between the
due process requirement of competent representation weighed
against the interest of not interfering with the chosen counsel of
the accused, which he also determined to be a due process require-
ment.22 The respondent, the superior court,2 s had argued that the
life-story fee contract presented a conflict of interest adverse to the
constitutional guarantees of the defendant's right to effective coun-
established through questions that Maxwell was literate (having completed the eighth
grade), had read the entire contract, and had signed and initialed several key paragraphs.
Id. at 611, 639 P.2d at 250-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
17. Id. at 612, 639 P.2d at 250-51, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Specifically, the court ruled
that (1) Maxwell "knowingly and willingly" declined to seek the advice of independent
counsel; (2) the competency of retained counsel was not at issue; and (3) retained counsel
must nevertheless be dismissed due to the inherent conflict of interest created by the con-
tract. Id. Maxwell sought mandate to overturn the trial court's ruling. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Maxwell v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1980), rev'd, Maxwell v. Supe-
rior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982). Presiding Justice Files
dissented, stating that a criminal defendant should be represented by the attorney of his
choice. He rejected the notion that an attorney will betray a client for his own gain. 161 Cal.
Rptr. at 861 (Files, J., dissenting).
20. 30 Cal. 3d at 619, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
21. Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Tobriner concurred in Justice Newman's majority
opinion. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr, at 187.
22. 30 Cal. 3d at 609, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
23. The People, the real party in interest, did not take a position on the superior
court's order in the trial or appellate courts. 30 Cal. 3d at 612 n.2, 639 P.2d at 251 n.2, 180
Cal. Rptr. at 180 n.2.
1983 775
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sel.2 Justice Newman stated that the right to counsel, as guaran-
teed by the California Constitution, includes the right to effective
counsel, and that a conflict of interest between counsel and client
may render advocacy deficient.
2 5
The court noted that protection of a defendant's right to loyal
counsel is essential.21 The trial judge must ensure that indigent de-
fendants have effective counsel, free from prejudicial conflicts.
Justice Newman stressed that the amount of prejudice need not be
shown when attacking a conviction on the ground that counsel's
performance was adversely influenced by conflicts of interest; in-
formed speculation that the conflict was prejudicial is sufficient to
warrant a reversal of the conviction.
2 8
Justice Newman observed that effective assistance of counsel is
closely related to representation by counsel of choice.2 9 He noted
that the courts have acknowledged that the right to counsel en-
compasses a defendant's right to choose his attorney if he has the
financial resources to do so.0 Justice Newman found that Califor-
nia decisions also support the principle that a defendant's right to
counsel, although not absolute, should serve to restrain the trial
judge from interfering with a defendant's choice of counsel when
24. Id. at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. Respondent further argued that
the contract violated ethical standards and encroached upon the integrity of the judicial
system. Id.
25. Id. See People v. Corona, 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978), in which
a criminal defendant entered into a life-story fee contract with his defense attorney who
failed to raise obvious mental defenses at trial resulting in the defendant's being found
guilty. Id. at 702, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The Maxwell court noted that "effective" counsel
envisions a higher standard than mere competence. 30 Cal. 3d at 612, 639 P.2d at 251, 180
Cal. Rptr. at 180.
26. Id.
27. Id. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), in which one defendant in a case
involving multiple representation alleged that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his defense lawyers represented conflicting interests. Id. at 338. But see People v.
Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663, 532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975), in which the defendants failed
to show denial of effective assistance of counsel because of multiple representation by de-
fense counsel. Id. at 673, 532 P.2d at 154, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
28. 30 Cal. 3d at 612-13, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180. See People v. Chacon,
69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968) (in case of multiple client representa-
tion, trial court's failure to advise criminal defendants of their right to separate counsel in
the event of a conflict of interest required reversal).
29. 30 Cal. 3d at 613, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
30. Id. at 613, 639 P.2d at 251, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81. See, e.g., Willis v. United
States, 614 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1979) (criminal defendant's claim of inadequate representa-
tion by defense counsel due to conflicts arising from joint representation of co-defendants
rejected); United States v. Bragan, 499 F.2d 1376 (4th Cir. 1974) (affirmance of district
court's decision, declaring that the absence of co-counsel at trial did not deprive the defen-
dant of his right to counsel of choice since he was represented by experienced trial counsel).
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he is financially able to retain an attorney."
Justice Newman also stressed that the trial judge should not re-
cuse counsel even if he believes the attorney to be incompetent. By
doing so, he would be infringing upon defendant's right to counsel
of his choice and likewise be challenging the independence of the
bar. 2 Furthermore, Justice Newman asserted that the court should
not inquire into the financial relationship between defendant and
his counsel, nor use this relationship as a basis for removing re-
tained counsel because the attorney-client relationship is indepen-
dent of the source of compensation.3 3 In Justice Newman's opin-
ion, any other holding would discriminate against an indigent's
relationship with his counsel.3 4 As viewed by Justice Newman, a
judge's duty to avoid appointment of conflict-free counsel does not
apply where counsel has been retained by a defendant." A defen-
dant has a right to retain counsel of his choice, a right which
should not be challenged by the trial courts.3 a
The court pointed out that a defendant's right to choose counsel
31. 30 Cal. 3d at 613, 639 P.2d at 252, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 181. See People v. Crovedi, 65
Cal. 2d 199, 417 P.2d 868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). In Crovedi, the court held that a reason-
able effort should be made to ensure that a defendant able to retain counsel will be repre-
sented by that counsel, particularly when the defendant is not responsible for counsel's ab-
sence. Id. at 207, 417 P.2d at 874, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 290. The court concluded that:
[T]he state should keep to a necessary minimum its interference with the individual's
desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using any legitimate
means within his resources-and that desire can constitutionally be forced to yield
only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a dis-
ruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of
the particular case.
Id. at 207-08, 417 P.2d at 874, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
32. 30 Cal. 3d at 614, 639 P.2d at 252, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 181. See Smith v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. 2d 547, 440 P.2d 65, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968). In Smith, the court ruled that a
trial judge may not dismiss defense counsel on the belief that the attorney was ignorant of
the controlling law in the case. Id. at 548, 440 P.2d at 75, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
33. 30 Cal. 3d at 614, 639 P.2d at 252, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 181. The court noted that as
was stated in Smith: "[Tihe relationship is independent of the source of compensation, for
an attorney's responsibility is to the person he has undertaken to represent rather than to
the individual or agency which pays for the service." Smith v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d at
547, 440 P.2d at 74, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
34. Id. See Ingram v. Justice Court, 69 Cal. 2d 832, 447 P.2d 650, 73 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1968). The court in Ingram ruled that the trial court cannot review a public defender's
determination that a defendant is indigent and entitled to his services. Id., 447 P.2d at 655,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 415. See also Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d
678, 537 P.2d 898, 122 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1975) (the involuntary removal of counsel severely
limits a defendant's right to counsel and should be exercised only on the most flagrant mis-
conduct or incompetence of counsel).
35. 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
36. Id. See People v. Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663, 532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975). See
supra note 27.
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also extends to his right to reject counsel.37 A mentally competent
defendant may dismiss his attorney and represent himself, thus
waiving his right to counsel, and the trial judge may not interfere
with the defendant's right to self-representation even if he doubts
the defendant's ability.38 Justice Newman stated that if a defen-
dant gives the court sufficient notice of his desire to substitute ap-
pointed counsel, the court should, at the very least, question the
defendant as to his reasons for such a request.3 Based on an exam-
ination of prior case law, Justice Newman concluded that because
a defendant's confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense, the
defendant's right to counsel of his choice must be respected by the
courts whenever possible.' 0
Justice Newman addressed the contrasting views of the effect of
a life-story fee contract on the integrity of the judicial system."1
One view is that such contracts are prejudicial and unethical be-
cause they tempt attorneys to act adversely to their client's inter-
est solely for commercial gain.'2 Justice Newman noted that such
contracts raise doubts under the California Rules of Professional
Conduct as well.
43
37. 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
38. Id. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The defendant in Faretta
waived assistance of counsel, desiring to conduct his own defense, but the trial court refused
to allow him to do so on the grounds that the defendant had not intelligently waived his
right to counsel and had no constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Id. at 809-10.
The United States Supreme Court overruled the trial court's decision, holding that Faretta
did indeed have a constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Id. at 836.
39. 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See People v. Marsden, 2
Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970), in which the court held that the defen-
dant was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when the trial
court denied the defendant's timely motion to substitute new counsel without giving the
defendant an opportunity to state reasons for his request. Id. at 126, 465 P.2d at 49, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 161.
40. 30 Cal. 3d at 615, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See Carrington, The
Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1291.
41. 30 Cal. 3d at 616, 639 P.2d at 253, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
42. Id. at 616, 639 P.2d at 253-54, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83. See United States v.
Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981). In Hearst, the
defendant's attorney entered into a publication contract which created potential conflicts of
interest and the court remanded the issue to the district court to determine whether the
contract violated the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel
during trial. Id. at 1193.
43. 30 Cal. 3d at 617-18 nn. 5 & 6, 639 P.2d at 253-54 nn. 5 & 6, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183
nn. 5 & 6. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-4 (1979), which provides
in pertinent part:
If, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from
his client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of
the employment, he may be tempted to subordinate the interests of his client to his
778
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Justice Newman observed that some California precedents had
recognized a court's power to recuse an attorney in order to guar-
antee a fair trial." He found that the issue ultimately involved a
conflict between a criminal defendant's right to counsel of his
choice and the legal profession's need to maintain its ethical stan-
dards.' Justice Newman noted that California courts have upheld
the dismissal of a district attorney who was personally prejudiced
against the defendant to insure the prosecutor's impartiality in a
criminal trial."6 This protection was also extended to potential con-
flicts of interest between appointed counsel and indigent criminal
defendants which were held so critical as to warrant reversal of a
conviction regardless of proof of actual prejudice to the client. 7
Nevertheless, the court found that these prior cases did not au-
own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains
from his client . . . publication rights with respect to the case may be influenced,
consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of his
publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these potentially differing
interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination
of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his employ-
ment has previously ended.
Id. See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-103(A) (1979), which pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or sub-
ject matter of litigation he is conducting for a client." Id. But cf. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA R. 5-101 (West 1981) [hereinafter cited as
C.R.C.P.], which provides in pertinent part:
A member of the State Bar shall not enter into a business transaction with a client
• . . unless (1) the transaction and terms in which the member of the State Bar ac-
quires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in manner and terms which should have reasona-
bly been understood by the client, (2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to
seek the advice of independent counsel of the client's choice on the transaction, and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Id. The court noted that the disclosure and advice of independent counsel provision in the
life-story fee contract was a patent attempt to adhere to the rules of the California bar. 30
Cal. 3d at 617 n.6, 639 P.2d at 254 n.6, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183 n.6.
44. Id. at 617, 639 P.2d at 254, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183. See Comden v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). In Comden, the court approved a trial
judge's order forcing an attorney to withdraw from a civil case because of the likelihood that
he would be called to testify. Id. at 915-16, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
45. 30 Cal. 3d at 617, 639 P.2d at 254, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183. See Comden v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 915, 576 P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13. See supra note 44.
46. 30 Cal. 3d at 617, 639 P.2d at 254, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183. See People v. Greer, 19
Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1977).
47. 30 Cal. 3d at 617-18, 639 P.2d at 254-55, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184. See People v.
Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 627 P.2d 188, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981) (irreconcilable conflicts
found in budgetary scheme which discouraged public defender from disqualifying himself in
multiple representation cases); People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 524 P.2d 363, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 235 (1974) (city prosecutor may not defend indigent criminal defendant).
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thorize dismissal of counsel in Maxwell's case."' The cases were
found to be distinguishable from Maxwell in that the defendants
themselves had either filed the recusal motion or had challenged
their appointed counsel on appeal; thus there was no question of
court interference with the defendants' right to chosen counsel.'9
Justice Newman explained that in Comden v. Superior Court"0
the California Supreme Court had suggested that the right to cho-
sen counsel must be weighed strictly against conflicts of interest,
professional ethics, and judicial integrity." Justice Newman
stressed that the mere possibility of a conflict did not warrant pre-
trial recusal over the defendant's informed objection."2 He con-
cluded that when the possibility of a conflict is disclosed to the
court and its inherent danger explained, the defendant may know-
ingly and intelligently waive the conflict and insist on representa-
tion by retained counsel.5
3
The court also explained that a defendant's waiver of potential
conflicts of interest cannot be inferred from a silent record"' stat-
ing that the court will not assume that a defendant has knowingly
and intelligently waived his right to alternate counsel if the defen-
dant's waiver is not on record, despite the fact that potential con-
48. 30 Cal. 3d at 618, 639 P.2d at 255, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
49. Id.
50. 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
51. 30 Cal. 3d at 618, 639 P.2d at 255, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184. See 20 Cal. 3d at 910, 576
P.2d at 975, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 13. See supra note 44. Since Comden, the California State Bar
has liberalized the rule on attorney-witnesses. See C.R.C.P., supra note 43, at R. 2-111
(A)(4). Counsel is not compelled to withdraw from a civil or a criminal case if the client
consents in writing after full disclosure of counsel's dual role as advocate and witness and an
opportunity to seek independent legal advice. Id. Thus, a defendant's right to chosen coun-
sel outweighs potential conflicts of interest and is not a threat to judicial integrity, provided
the defendant is fully informed of counsel's dual role. 30 Cal. 3d at 619 n.9, 639 P.2d at 255
n.9, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184-85 n.9.
52. 30 Cal. 3d at 619, 639 P.2d at 255-56, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
53. Id. The court explicitly disapproved of People v. Wolfe, 69 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138
Cal. Rptr. 235 (1977), in which the court of appeals upheld the trial court's recusal of a city
councilman/attorney who represented a criminal defendant despite the defendant's in-
formed waiver of any potential conflicts. California and United States Supreme Court prece-
dents confirm that conflicts of interest may be waived and such waiver may not be attacked
on federal constitutional grounds. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); People v.
Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968). See supra notes 27, 28. How-
ever, on appeal the defendant may argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
for other reasons, but the burden rests with him to show that the ineffective assistance did
not arise from the conflict which was waived. 30 Cal. 3d at 619 n.11, 639 P.2d at 256 n.11,
180 Cal. Rptr. at 185 n.11.
54. 30 Cal. 3d at 620, 639 P.2d at 256, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185. See Carnley v. Cochran,
369 U.S. 506 (1962) (defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to coun-
sel; thus he was denied effective assistance of counsel during trial).
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flicts were brought to the attention of the trial judge.55 Justice
Newman found that in Maxwell, the defendant and the court were
thoroughly informed of the conflicts arising from the life-story fee
contract prior to trial, but the defendant nevertheless refused to
change counsel.5 6 Justice Newman believed that the defendant's
insistence on proceeding with his chosen counsel constituted a
knowing and intelligent waiver of potential conflicts and precluded
their recusal. 57 Justice Newman further noted that some federal
cases have implied that an effective waiver applies only to conflicts
which are explored by the trial judge.5 8 He pointed out, however,
that the trial judge may not be able to explore all imaginable con-
sequences of a conflict because the information required to assess
such consequences may be privileged.59 Justice Newman main-
tained that in the parallel area of self-representation, a defendant's
informed waiver of counsel has been held sufficient to allow trial to
proceed where the defendant has been warned of the danger of
proceeding on his own.60
Justice Newman determined that the trial court's procedure in
Maxwell sufficiently established that the defendant had been com-
petent to waive his rights."' He pointed out that there had been
55. 30 Cal. 3d at 620, 639 P.2d at 256, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 185. See People v. Carter, 66
Cal. 2d 666, 427 P.2d 214, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967) (no waiver of right to counsel found
where a defendant's willingness to proceed without counsel was predicated upon his request
for use of library facilities, which was accepted by the trial judge but never executed). See
also Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the
Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. Rav. 119, 158-59 (1978).
56. 30 Cal. 3d at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
57. Id.
58. Id. See United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) (in multiple
representaton case, defendant's waiver of potential conflicts was held ineffective); United
States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977) (in multiple representation case, the court
held that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived right to separate representation af-
ter extensive pretrial questioning of defendants and their counsel by the trial judge); United
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975) (in multiple representation case where co-
defendants testified against each other, the court held that the Constitution permits the
defendants to waive intelligently and knowingly their right to effective counsel after thor-
ough consultation with the trial judge).
59. 30 Cal. 3d at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
60. Id. See United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (3d Cir. 1978); People v.
Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663, 532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1975). See supra notes 27 & 58. See
also Geer, supra note 55, at 148-51.
61. 30 Cal. 3d at 621, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186. See People v. Teron, 23
Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979) (criminal defendant is competent to
waive counsel if the election is made voluntarily and intelligently). But cf. People v. Lopez,
71 Cal. App. 3d 568, 138 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977) (defendant did not knowingly and intelligently
waive right to counsel when he was not advised of the hazards of self-representation until
after his request was granted).
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extensive pretrial inquiries into the terms of the contract where
the potential economic conflicts of interest were detailed, that
Maxwell was fully informed of the rights he was waiving, and that
a psychological examination had revealed that Maxwell was com-
petent to waive his rights.2 The court thus overturned ,the trial
court's recusal order, concluding that Maxwell's waiver of potential
conflicts was effectively and knowingly executed."3 The court
stressed, however, that its opinion expressed no moral or ethical
approval of life-story fee contracts, but rather addressed only the
narrow issue of right to representation by chosen counsel.
6 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaus stated that he had hoped
the court's opinion would have been harsher as to the propriety of
the life-story fee contract. If the court had cast doubt on the life-
story fee contract as a viable source of compensation, he explained,
this issue probably would not recur.65 Justice Kaus's reason for
joining in the majority's result, however, was that in his opinion
the California State Bar Court, rather than the trial court, had the
duty to act on the ethical questions raised by a life-story fee con-
tract.6 He concluded that the trial court could not prevent Max-
well from raising attorney-client conflicts on appeal, if necessary.6 7
Chief Justice Bird, in a concurring and dissenting opinion,
agreed with the majority that the life-story fee contract was valid,
subject to an effective waiver of potential conflicts of interest. 8
Chief Justice Bird noted that the courts have diligently worked to
protect a defendant's right to be defended by his choice of counsel,
regardless of his economic situation.6 She observed that under the
current system of justice, an indigent defendant may accept court-
appointed counsel who may be a public defender or a private attor-
ney; however, court-appointed attorneys generally are not properly
62. 30 Cal. 3d at 621-22, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
63. Id. at 622, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Justice Newman also found that
the trial judge had reviewed each of the disclosure sections in the contract to ensure that
the defendant fully understood each one. Id.
64. Id. at 622, 639 P.2d at 257-58, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
65. Id. at 622-23, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Kaus, J., concurring). See Corn-
den v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 906, 576 P.2d 971, 145 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978) (Manuel, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 44.
67. 30 Cal. 3d at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. (Kaus, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
69. Id. at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dis-




compensated, rendering it uneconomical for private attorneys to
accept a court appointment.70 Justice Bird stressed that the defen-
dant's right to choose his counsel is an essential fundamental free-
dom, 7 1 and that a life-story fee contract may be the only way an
indigent criminal defendant can secure counsel of his choice.7 2
Chief Justice Bird maintained that to hold any life-story agree-
ment impermissible would be to foreclose the indigent from per-
haps his only opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice; she,
therefore, cautioned counsel retained through this type of fee ar-
rangement not to exploit their clients." Chief Justice Bird thus
concurred with the majority's view that a life-story fee contract is a
valid method of retaining an attorney but that the defendant must
knowingly and intelligently waive potential conflicts of interest
arising from the contract.
74
The Chief Justice dissented in part because she believed that
Maxwell was not aware of the ramifications of waiving the conflicts
which were detailed in his contract.7 The trial judge's identifica-
tion of the basic problem and a statement that not all problems are
foreseeable may be sufficient for an attorney, but they are inade-
quate for an intelligent decision by a lay person such as Maxwell.7
Chief Justice Bird noted that Maxwell did not seek self-
representaton, but he needed and desired skilled legal advice.7
She stressed that a lay person such as Maxwell needs legal assis-
tance to fully understand the consequences of a waiver.78
70. 30 Cal. 3d at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188. (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
71. 30 Cal. 3d at 623, 639 P.2d at 258, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187. (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting). See People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 588 P.2d 765, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625
(1978). In Holland, the trial court failed to aid the defendant in recovering funds confis-
cated at his arrest for use in retaining private counsel. The court held that the defendant
was entitled to use his own resources to retain counsel of his choice and concluded that the
trial court's failure to intervene violated the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. Id.
at 89, 588 P.2d at 772, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
72. 30 Cal. 3d at 624, 639 P.2d at 258-59, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
73. Id. The Chief Justice further warned that an attorney must never be a party to
violation of constitutionally enumerated rights. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 625, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
76. Id. at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dis-
senting). The Chief Justice found inappropriate Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
See supra note 38.





Chief Justice Bird pointed out that the contract in question
raised a myriad of legal complications even to one trained in the
law.79 For example, Maxwell was not told that by accepting. his
counsel and waiving the conflicts of interest detailed in the con-
tract, he could be precluded from raising certain issues such as in-
adequacy of counsel on appeal, particularly if the claim was predi-
cated upon the conflicts waived by him in the pretrial inquiry.80
Furthermore, Chief Justice Bird noted that Maxwell was not spe-
cifically informed of the impact of his waiver of the attorney-client
privilege."1 She particularly criticized this aspect of Maxwell's
waiver, by speculating that if he was convicted, but on appeal his
conviction was reversed and remanded for retrial, Maxwell's cur-
rent counsel was not obligated to represent him, and under the
terms of the contract they could demand that he waive the attor-
ney-client privilege prior to retrial.8 2 Any confidential information
transmitted to these attorneys would then be vulnerable to sub-
poena by the prosecution on retrial.8 Chief Justice Bird indicated
that neither the trial court nor the written contract addressed
these issues, and thus the record failed to show that Maxwell
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.84 The Chief Justice,
therefore, recommended the issuance of a peremptory writ, in-
structing the trial court to conduct further hearings, advising the
defendant of all the potential conflicts and their corresponding
consequences;85 at which time Maxwell could decide whether to re-
tain the attorneys who were parties to the contract. 86
Justice Richardson dissented on the grounds that the conflicts of
interest which arose as a result of the life-story fee contract were
79. Id. at 624, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
80. Id. at 624-25, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
81. Id. at 625, 639 P.2d at 259, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dis-
senting). Section 37 of the contract provided that Maxwell would "waive upon demand by
Lawyers the so called attorney-client privilege and any and all other privileges and rights
which would prevent the full and complete exercise and exploitation of the rights granted to
Lawyers herein." Id. (emphasis supplied by the court). Maxwell was not informed of the
impact of this section on his privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
82. Id.




86. Id. at 625-26, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). See United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Eag-




irreconcilable and justified the recusal of defense counsel."7 In his
view, Maxwell's life-story fee contract contained several objection-
able features, including giving the attorneys irrevocable ownership
and unlimited use of Maxwell's life story, past, present, and future;
not requiring the attorneys to represent Maxwell on appeal; and
allowing the defendant to waive the attorney-client privilege.8 Ac-
cording to Justice Richardson, these terms of the contract
threatened to deny the defendant serious present and future pro-
cedural protections.8 9 Justice Richardson noted that agreements of
this kind have been condemned on ethical grounds, and if imple-
mented, would seriously erode the integrity of the judicial
system.90
Justice Richardson opined that while Maxwell was entitled to
conflict-free counsel, a defendant's right to counsel of his choice is
not constitutionally absolute.91 In Justice Richardson's opinion,
due process mandates that assistance of counsel be "effective," and
therefore, appointment of an attorney other than the one re-
quested by the defendant does not violate the defendant's consti-
tutional rights.92 In drawing the conclusion that the defendant's
right to counsel of his choice is not absolute, the courts have
stressed two major values crucial to the judicial system. 3 One
value concerns preservation of the public's confidence in the sys-
tem of criminal justice, 4 the second is the defendant's right to rep-
87. 30 Cal. 3d at 626, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). In Justice Richardson's view, the court's duty to assure a conflict-free defense repre-
sented the paramount interest. Id.
88. Id. Additional terms of the contract which disturbed Justice Richardson included:
(1) the attorneys' right to 85% of the proceeds from exploiting the defendant's life story; (2)
defendant's obligation to compensate his attorneys vested immediately in the attorneys; and
(3) defendant's waiver of all claims for defamation in the exploitation of his life story. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 626, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 627, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (trial court bears the responsibility of safe-
guarding the defendant's rights and ensuring that the waiver is made voluntarily and intelli-
gently). See also Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973) (indigent defendant with court-appointed counsel
is not entitled to choose his attorney). The Drumgo court concluded that the defendant's
constitutional and statutory rights were not violated by appointment of an attorney whom
the defendant had not requested. Id. at 934, 506 P.2d at 1009, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
93. 30 Cal. 3d at 627, 639 P.2d at 260, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
94. Id. at 627, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See
People v. Wolfe, 69 Cal. App. 3d 714, 138 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1977). See supra note 53.
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resentation by legal counsel.95 Justice Richardson concluded that a
defendant's right to representation by conflict-free legal counsel is
paramount to the defendant's preference of counsel,9 6 particularly
when the defendant faces such serious consequences as the death
penalty.
9 7
Justice Richardson outlined the conflicts of interest which were
created by the life-story fee contract in Maxwell.9 8 He found that
although the contract specifically outlined several conflicts which
might arise due to counsel's economic interests 9 and that Max-
well's counsel promised to diligently defend him at trial, 100 such
,promises were already required by law through the fiduciary rela-
tionship of attorney-client. 1 1 Justice Richardson noted that in
People v. Barboza,10 2 the court had dismissed counsel because the
financial relationship between the county and the public defender's
office created financial conflicts of interest which might have af-
fected the attorney's trial tactics and hindered the defendant's
right to effective counsel.103 He similarly found that in People v.
Corona,G in which counsel had a financial interest in a life-story
fee contract, the court had concluded that the contract created a
conflict which prevented the attorney from giving his undivided
loyalty to the client. 0 5
Justice Richardson then stated his belief that the life-story fee
contract in Maxwell contained "built-in" conflicts which were not
detailed in the contract, nor revealed by the trial judge's question-
95. 30 Cal. 3d at 627, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring).
In Carrigan, defendants Carrigan and White were convicted of interstate transportation of
stolen goods. Both defendants were represented by one counsel. A conflict arose when Carri-
gan gave testimony inconsistent with White's prior statements to investigators. Id.




99. Id. at 627-28, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
See supra note 12.
100. 30 Cal. 3d at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 628, 639 P.2d at 261, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
102. 29 Cal. 3d 375, 627 P.2d 188, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981). See supra note 47.
103. 30 Cal. 3d at 628-29, 639 P.2d at 261-62, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
104. 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978). See supra note 25.
105. 80 Cal. App. 3d at 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915. The court stated that "[f]rom that
moment on, trial counsel was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests-he was




ing. 10 Justice Richardson clarified these conflicts by considering
the tactical decisions which Maxwell's trial counsel may have con-
fronted prior to trial.10 7 He questioned counsel's objectivity in con-
sidering a possible plea bargain which would avoid a trial but
which would also reduce the commercial value of Maxwell's life
story. 08 If Maxwell was tried, Justice Richardson speculated as to
whether counsel would permit him to testify to enhance the
saleability of the life story. 109 He also questioned whether counsel
would assert the insanity defense, thus threatening the validity of
the fee contract.1' 0 Justice Richardson argued that the evidence
failed to support the majority's position that Maxwell had fully
recognized the legal implications of his waiver, including
knowledge of the inherent conflicts not detailed in the contract."'
Expressing doubt about counsel's pretrial good faith assurances
to conduct a proper defense, Justice Richardson argued that it is
nearly impossible for a trial judge to assess the impact of conflict
of interest on counsel's decisions in plea bargains.' Likewise, Jus-
tice Richardson challenged the trial court's ability to fairly identify
all the motives behind defense counsel's pretrial and trial decisions
in a multiple murder case. 1 3 He concluded that neither the defen-
dant, the trial court, nor the appellate court can assess the impact
of conflicts of interest on defense counsel's trial strategy." 4
Justice Richardson noted that Maxwell had agreed to waive the
attorney-client privilege upon demand by his counsel,'" but found






111. Id. at 630, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 630, 639 P.2d at 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. Id. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The court reversed the trial
court's denial of defense counsel's motion for separate counsel for the co-defendants he was
representing. The defense counsel's request was predicated upon possible conflicts of inter-
est which arose from confidential information received from the defendants. Id. at 490-91.
115. 30 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). The lower court applied the RuLs oF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA R. 5-101. See supra note 43, to paragraph 37 of the life-story fee contract which
provides in pertinent part: "Maxwell does hereby agree to waive upon demand by Lawyers
the so called attorney-client privilege and any and all other privileges and rights which
would prevent the full and complete exercise and exploitation of the rights granted to
Lawyers herein." 30 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (emphasis
supplied by the court).
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that a waiver of this confidential relationship may have inhibited
communications between them, thus jeopardizing Maxwell's de-
fense at trial and interfering with the judicial process.", Justice
Richardson observed that although counsel had conceded that the
waiver of the attorney-client privilege was overreaching, the defen-
dant had still pledged to assist the attorneys by disclosing any in-
formation required by them or their agents in exploiting his life
story.'1 7 In essence, Justice Richardson found that the substance of
a waiver remained in the contract, and such disclosure was irrecon-
cilable with the attorneys' duty to preserve Maxwell's confi-
dences."' Justice Richardson pointed out that another problem
with the life-story fee contract was that it only obligated Maxwell's
attorneys to represent him during trial, leaving them free to publi-
cize confidential communications during Maxwell's appeal, should
he be convicted." 9 He hypothesized that the appellate briefs might
be filed contemporaneously with the publishing of Maxwell's life
story.'20 With no right to suppress publication, Maxwell could for-
feit his rights to preserve attorney-client confidences during his ap-
peal and on subsequent retrial.'
2 '
Justice Richardson then addressed the impact of judicial ap-
proval of life-story fee contracts on the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem.'22 He noted that although the average lay person accepts the
life-story fee contract as an ordinary commercial agreement, the
legal impropriety of the contract soils the ethical relationship be-
tween attorney and client.' Justice Richardson warned that if the
116. Id. at 631, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The
appellate court noted that "[t]he confidential relationship between attorney and client is at
the heart of a proper functioning of our judicial system." Maxwell v. Superior Court, 161
Cal. Rptr. 849, 854 (1980), rev'd, Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 606, 631, 639 P.2d
248, 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 192 (1982).
117. 30 Cal. 3d at 631, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 192 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). Paragraph 33 of the life-story fee contract provided that the defendant "promises, cov-
enants and agrees to assist the lawyers at any and all times and in any and all ways permis-
sible by law in the protecton, exercise, and exploitation of their rights to the Story." Id.
118. Id. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (Deering 1974), which provides in perti-
nent part: "It is the duty of an attorney. . .(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at
every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client." Id.
119. 30 Cal. 3d at 631, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Richardson cautioned that at the appellate stage Maxwell would no longer be
the "owner" of his life story and that his former attorneys might only be interested in pro-
moting the sale of the story. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 632, 639 P.2d at 263, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 632, 639 P.2d at 263-64, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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courts accepted life-story fee contracts such as the one in dispute,
public trust in the judicial process would deteriorate, a trust which
is predicated on the fiduciary relationship and protection of the
client's legal rights, not on economic advantage.1 4 Justice Richard-
son stated that the life-story fee contract has been discouraged by
the American Bar Association (ABA).'"" He argued that life-story
fee contracts should be judicially condemned, 2 6 concluding that it
is the court's duty to maintain the integrity of the judicial system
and promote public confidence in criminal justice. 27 Justice Rich-
ardson argued that the majority's conclusion conflicted with Cali-
fornia decisions which emphasize that a defendant may waive
rights which protect him, but rights which belong to the public and
impose a duty on the court cannot be waived. 2 8 He noted that, in
fact, waiver of these rights has been held ineffective when it in-
volved denying a parallel duty imposed upon the court. 2 9 Justice
Richardson explained that the majority's holding raised the defen-
dant's right to counsel of his choice above the court's "correlative
duty" to insure that the defendant has effective, conflict-free coun-
sel. 30 He found that the trial judge has the duty to conduct a fair
and lawful trial, without becoming subservient to defense counsel's
objections regarding the defendant's right to assistance of
124. Id.
125. Id. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrry, EC 5-4 (1979). See supra
note 43. In addition, the latest discussion draft of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucT prohibits this form of contractual agreement outright, declaring: "An agreement
by which a lawyer acquires literary rights concerning the subject matter of the representa-
tion involves incompatible standards for the lawyer's performance, one being effectiveness
in representing the client and the other being performance that has literary value." Com-
ment, Proposed Rule 1.9(d). See 30 Cal. 3d at 633, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
126. 30 Cal. 3d at 633, 639 P.2d at 264, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 193 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See United States v. Hearst, 639 F.2d 1190, 1198, cert. denied sub nom. Hearst v.
United States, 452 U.S. 931 (1981).
127. 30 Cal. 3d at 633, 639 P.2d at 264-65, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). See People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 524 P.2d 363, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1974). See
supra note 47.
128. 30 Cal. 3d at 634, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1981), cert.
denied, sub nom., California v. Chadd, 452 U.S. 931 (1982) (the court denied a criminal
defendant facing the death penalty the right to plead guilty against the advice of counsel).
129. 30 Cal. 3d at 634, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979). See supra
note 61.





In essence, Justice Richardson concluded that the ultimate issue
before the court involved a conflict of a defendant's right to choice
of counsel and the need to maintain professional ethics.13 2 Justice
Richardson would choose to preclude an attorney from entering
into a fee arrangement which could hinder his performance during
trial.13 3 He was not persuaded by the majority's argument that the
defendant successfully may waive his right to conflict-free counsel
because an independent right to self-representation had previously
been found by the California courts. 3 4 The issue before the Max-
well court did not involve a defendant's right to self-representa-
tion, but whether the trial court had the power to demand conflict-
free counsel for defendant. "'
In conclusion, Justice Richardson noted that the ethical position
established in California decrees that fidelity is one of the princi-
pal obligations of an attorney, and an attorney should jealously
guard the secret confidences of his client."' This rule prevents an
attorney from putting himself in a compromising situation to
choose between conflicting interests rather than expend his ener-
gies exclusively in the interest of his client.13 7 Justice Richardson
stated that although the majority did not give their moral or ethi-
cal approval of life-story fee contracts, the decision nevertheless
sanctioned their use. 38 He concluded that the majority should
have candidly declared such contracts invalid to avoid any misap-
prehension of the interested parties.13 Justice Richardson would
thus have judicially declared life-story fee contracts invalid as a
131. Id. at 635, 639 P.2d at 265, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978), in which the United States Supreme Court stated
that "the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of
assuring its proper conduct." Id. at 341-42.
132. 30 Cal. 3d at 635, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id. Justice Richardson perceived the court as being the proper forum for resolv-
ing the issue. Id.
134. Id. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See supra note 38.
135. 30 Cal. 3d at 635-36, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
136. 30 Cal. 3d at 636, 639 P.2d at 266, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 195 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. See Anderson v. Eaton, 211 Cal. 116, 293 P. 788 (1930) (contract retaining
attorney held void as against public policy because attorney represented defendant insur-
ance agency and plaintiff in same cause of action).





rule of criminal procedure."0
California courts have held that the defendant's right to repre-
sentation by counsel of his choice is unqualified. In People v.
Crovedi,141 Crovedi's counsel suffered a heart attack during trial,
and the court appointed new counsel from the same law firm to
represent Crovedi. Refusing new counsel, Crovedi requested a six
week continuance until his original attorney recuperated, but the
trial court denied his request and gave the new counsel one week
to prepare his case.' 4 The California Supreme Court weighed the
desire for a speedy trial with the defendant's right to retain coun-
sel of his choice, and concluded that although the defendant did
not have an absolute right to be represented by counsel of his
choice, a reasonable effort should be made to ensure that a
defendant finacially able to retain his own counsel should be repre-
sented by that counsel."
4
-
Along the same lines, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a defendant's right to choose counsel also extends to self-rep-
resentation. 44 In Faretta v. California,"45 the defendant waived as-
sistance of counsel, desiring to conduct his own defense; but the
trial court refused on the grounds that the defendant had not in-
telligently waived his right to counsel and that he had no constitu-
tional right to conduct his own defense. '4 The Court vacated the
ruling, holding that a criminal defendant does have a constitu-
tional right, based on the historical development of the English
court system"47 and implied by the sixth amendment, to conduct
his own defense without counsel when he freely and intelligently
140. Id. See People v. Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375, 627 P.2d 188, 173 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981);
People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal. 3d 180, 524 P.2d 363, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1974). See supra note
47.
141. 65 Cal. 2d 199, 417 P.2d 868, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). See supra note 31.
142. 65 Cal. 2d at 202, 417 P.2d at 870-71, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 286-87.
143. Id. at 207, 417 P.2d at 874, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
144. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). See supra note 38.
145. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
146. Id. at 808-10.
147. Id. at 821. The Star Chamber, which flourished in Great Britain in the late 16th
and early 17th centuries, was the only tribunal in English legal history to force counsel upon
an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. Id. The defendant's answer to an indict-
ment was not accepted unless signed by counsel; and if counsel refused to sign, the defen-
dant was assumed to have confessed. Id. at 821-22. The Star Chamber was dissolved in 1641
along with the idea of obligatory counsel. Id. at 823. The common law evolved into a prac-
tice of mandatory self-representation for serious crimes. Id. By 1836, a defendant accused of
a felony was permitted to retain counsel, and more recently the court would appoint counsel
at the defendant's request. Id. at 825. At no point in the reform of the criminal justice
system was counsel forced upon a defendant. Id. at 825-26.
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makes such a choice.14 8
These cases and others prior to Maxwell dealt with the defen-
dant's right to choose counsel; they did not, however, deal with
pretrial removal of defense counsel because of possible conflicts of
interest. The situation has arisen in criminal cases, however, where
joint representation has frequently been held a source of conflict.
In such cases, defense counsel is not barred per se in pretrial pro-
ceedings.1 49 The rationale has been that although the mere possi-
bility of a conflict in cases of multiple representation will not war-
rant reversal of a criminal conviction,1 50 the defendants should be
fully informed prior to trial of the facts underlying potential con-
flicts 51 and of their right to separate counsel. Thus, in People v.
Chacon, 52 the California Supreme Court held that a waiver of the
right to separate counsel cannot be inferred from the defendant's
silence;153 instead, this right must be expressly waived by the de-
fendants prior to trial. Likewise, the Chacon court and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Garcia1 54 stressed the
importance of fully informing defendants of their right to separate
counsel if the court knows or should know that the possibility of a
conflict exists.
1 55
The right to representation by counsel of one's choice was first
proclaimed as a constitutional right in Garcia,15a in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to self-
representation was implied by the sixth amendment. The right to
choice of counsel has been referred to as a constitutional right
stemming from the right to self-representation.1 57 In Faretta, how-
ever, the Court found that the right to self-representation was an
independent constitutional right, not to be inferred from the right
148. Id. at 819.
149. See Comment, Conflicting Interests in Lawyer-Client Publication Rights Agree-
ments-The Story of Bobby Joe Maxwell, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 869, 881 (1981). See also
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). See supra note 114. The Holloway Court ruled
that the possibility of ineffective counsel in a case of joint representation is outweighed by
the economical and perhaps even strategical benefit of joint representation. 435 U.S. at 482.
150. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). See Ray v. Rose, 535 F.2d 966 (6th
Cir. 1976) (the court sustained the appellate court ruling that defendant failed to show that
he was prejudiced during trial by literary contracts with a third person who agreed to sell
defendant's life story to finance his defense).
151. United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976).
152. 69 Cal. 2d 765, 447 P.2d 106, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1968).
153. Id. at 771, 447 P.2d at 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
154. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
155. 69 Cal. 2d at 771, 447 P.2d at 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 16. See supra note 28.
156. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
157. See United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975). See supra note 58.
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to waive assistance of counsel.' 8
Although a life-story fee contract has been held to prevent an
attorney from adequately representing his client, it has not been
the basis for removal of counsel in the pretrial stage. For example,
in People v. Corona,18 an attorney retained under a life-story fee
contract failed to address at trial the question of the sanity of his
client, a criminal defendant charged with multiple murders.6 0 The
California Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant was
prejudiced by the attorney's conduct, and that the fee arrangement
prevented the attorney from adequately representing his client."'
Thus, the court of appeals held that actual prejudice had re-
sulted.1 62 The court's decision was based on its review of the entire
record after trial, which revealed that counsel had failed to raise
the crucial mental defenses. 63 In contrast, Maxwell involved a pre-
trial recusal of counsel as a matter of law, where the only evidence
of prejudice on the part of defense counsel was the contract it-
self. 64 Thus, the decision in Maxwell is a logical one on this basis.
In addition, the court's refusal to strike down all life-story fee
contracts as unethical may be justifiable in another sense. As noted
by Chief Justice Bird, the life-story fee contract provides an indi-
gent defendant with the financial resources required to retain pri-
vate counsel."' Although conflicts of interest may arise, they are
subject to waiver provided the defendant is fully informed of the
consequences. 166
One problem with the court's decision is that a waiver is ineffec-
tive if the defendant is unaware that a conflict may develop. 6 7 As
a layman, the defendant may not comprehend the effect of a
waiver on trial strategies and defenses. 68 In addition, the courts
158. 422 U.S. at 836.
159. 80 Cal. App. 3d 685, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1978).
160. Id. at 702, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
161. Id. at 720, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
162. Id. at 727, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 920.
163. Id. at 706, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
164. 30 Cal. 3d at 610, 639 P.2d at 249, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
165. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
166. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See supra note 92.
167. See Geer, supra note 55, at 140.
168. See id. Maxwell's attorneys' actions prior to trial manifested no obvious adverse
effects from these potential conflicts. Maxwell's counsel reserved the insanity plea, re-
quested a closed preliminary hearing (possibly to curtail publicity), and disclosed all con-
flicts to the trial court and the defendant as required by the California State Bar. 30 Cal. 3d
at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. See supra note 12. See also Comment, supra
note 149, at 889.
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have difficulty determining whether an unsophisticated defendant
fully understands the rights waived, or, in a pretrial waiver,
whether the defendant foresees all the possible conflicts which may
occur.169 If the trial court cannot determine the extent of the de-
fendant's understanding, the court's efforts to adequately inform
the defendant of the consequences of a waiver will most likely be
ineffective.
170
Because of this, the courts may be forced to rely on the attor-
neys themselves to explain to their clients the consequences of a
waiver. 17 1 The results may not be helpful. In theory, an attorney
has an obligation to withdraw from cases where potential conflicts
may adversely influence his defense of a client, 17 2 not only to pro-
tect the client's interest, but to protect the public's interest in a
fair and expeditious trial.17 3 However, one study of lawyer's ethics
implies that practicing attorneys do not give avoidance of conflict
of interest high priority, and another study indicates that attor-
neys generally are unaware of many of their ethical obligations as
outlined in the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 74 An attor-
ney's ethical obligation to avoid conflicts is designed to protect the
interests of the client, and a defendant will rely on his counsel's
judgment to advise him of any conflicts which may jeopardize his
defense.
17 5
In Maxwell, defense counsel attempted to fulfill their ethical ob-
ligations by carefully following the California Rules of Professional
Conduct, disclosing the potential conflicts and advising Maxwell to
seek the advice of independent counsel. 17 In addition, the conflicts
found by the trial court in Maxwell were not irreconcilible. The
court's concerns pertaining to adverse publicity and conviction
were either weak or non-existent conflicts because publicity of this
169. See Geer, supra note 55. In Maxwell, the foreseeable conflicts of interest which
arose as a result of the life-story fee contract focused on counsel's potential to create adverse
publicity of the trial, to avoid an insanity plea, and to aid in the defendant's conviction for
added publicity value. 30 Cal. 3d at 611, 639 P.2d at 250, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 179. See supra
note 12. As noted by Chief Justice Bird and Justice Richardson, the trial court and the
majority failed to address potential conflicts, such as waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
not explicitly mentioned as conflicts in the contract. 30 Cal. 3d at 625, 639 P.2d at 259, 180
Cal. Rptr. at 188-89 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
170. See Geer, supra note 55, at 142.
171. 30 Cal. 3d at 617, 639 P.2d at 254, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
172. See Geer, supra note 55, at 149.
173. Id. at 151.
174. Id. at 153.
175. Id. at 154.
176. See C.R.C.P., supra note 43, at R. 5-101.
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type could ruin counsels' reputation as competent criminal attor-
neys.' 7 Also, as noted by the Maxwell majority, the potential con-
flicts raised in a life-story fee contract are no more prejudicial than
some other financial arrangements between attorney and client.178
Ultimately, the determination of right and wrong will remain with
the attorney who must act in accordance with his moral and ethi-
cal conscience.'
7 9
The United States Supreme Court's reluctance to interfere judi-
cially with attorney-client fee arrangements may be evidenced by
the Court's refusal to grant certiorari in cases involving life-story
fee contracts.'80 Even the Maxwell court did not explicitly rule on
the ethics of these arrangements.' 8' Instead, the majority limited
the court's duty to ensuring that the defendant's waiver of poten-
tial conflicts of interest inherent in these contracts is made know-
ingly and intelligently. The Maxwell court should have gone one
step further and held that the courts will not regulate these fee
arrangements between attorney and client, without a showing of
actual prejudice, but instead will leave such regulation to the local
bar association.
Cynthia Ann Watson
177. 30 Cal. 3d at 618 n.8, 639 P.2d at 255 n.8, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.8.
178. Id. See Maxwell v, Superior Court, 161 Cal. Rptr. 849, 862 (1980) (Files, J., dis-
senting). For example, a flat fee arrangement may encourage an attorney to dispose of the
case quickly, while an hourly rate would encourage an attorney to prolong the case to obtain
the maximum fee. Moreover, the contingent fee contract may potentially create a conflict
when an attorney seeks a quick settlement to the detriment of the client. 30 Cal. 3d at 618
n.8, 639 P.2d at 255 n.8, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.8.
179. See Comment, The Lawyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1335, 1336.
180. See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
938 (1981). See supra note 42.
181. 30 Cal. 3d at 622, 639 P.2d at 257, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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